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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
HAROLD L. WARD, C. ARNOLD FERRIN
and LUCILLE N. FERRIN, his wife, LESLIE
OLSEN and JESSIE OLSEN, his wife, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

WHAT ISSUES ARE INVOLVED IN THIS
APPEAL~

Before entering into a general discussion of the
matters set forth in appellant's brief, we deem it necessary to point out to this court the following facts :
This appeal presents some interesting and novel
problems. Weber Basin Water Cons·ervancy District
(hereinafter referred to as District) filed an action in
the District Court of Weber County, No. 32126, to
condemn 66.8 acres of land, title to which was vested
in defendants Ferrin and being purchased under contract by defendants Olsen. The tract so condemned
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extended about one half the width of said farm. The
State of Utah by and through its road commission
(hereinafter called the State) also filed an action, No.
32213, wherein it sought to condemn 5.66 acres out of
the remainder of said farm for roadways. These roadways begin near the Northwest corner of the 66.9 acre
tract and extend some distance through the remainder
of the Olsen farm where the road divides, one leading
to the left across the remainder of the Olsen farm
from which a highway to a small farming community
know as Liberty and the other extending in a Northeasterly direction to the town of Eden. (See defendant's Exhibit 1.) It is apparent, therefore, that neither
action results in a complete severance of the Olsen
farm but the combined actions result in a complete
severance of the fanns and cuts the portion of the
farm not taken into three small irregular tracts. This
presented a novel situation with respect to severance
damages.
If the cases were tried separately each plaintiff
could deny that its action resulted in a complete severance, thereby n1aking it dif~icult for a jury to determine
how 1nuch severance da1nage was caused by each separate condemnor. By reason of this novel situation, the
parties entered into a written stipulation (See Page 37
Record in File No. 33:213) the essence of which provided:
1. That the two cases be consolidated for trial

and tried together.
2. That the follo,Ying issues would be
Iuitted to the jury:

:5Ub-

A. That a jury would return a judgment

2
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in favor of defendants jointly and against
plaintiff District for the fair market
value of the 66.88 acres so condemned by
it.
B. That the jury would return a judgn1ent
in favor of defendants jointly against
the State for the fair market value of
the 5.66 acres so condemned; and
C. That the issue as to the amount of severance damages, if any, which defendants
would be 'entitled to receive, be submitted
to the jury and judgment entered against
both plaintiffs for the total amount of
severance damages, if any, jointly caused
by the taking of the lands by the plaintiffs jointly.
D. That the court n1ay then apportion the
severance damages, if any, between the
two plaintiffs and enter judg1nent accordingly.
A jury was i1npanelled and the cause submitted to
the jury under a special verdict in accordance with the
stipulation. The jury returned the following special
verdict:
1. $33,400.00 against the District for the value of
the 66.8 acres.
2. $2,830.00 against the State for the value of the
5.66 acres.
3. $23,109.00 severance darnages against both plaintiffs.
The State of Utah apparently was satisfied with the
verdict. It filed no motion for a new trial, nor did it
3
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appeal to this court. Therefore, the judgment as against
State became final March 7, 1958. Plaintiff District
filed a rnotion for a new trial. This 1notion was overruled on March 31, 1958 and on April 29, 1958 (long
after the judgment against State had become final)
District filed a notice of appeal to this court. The
notice of appeal says that plaintiff District appeals
to the Supren1e Court from that certain judgment in
favor of defendants and against the plaintiff District.
NOTE: The appeal is from the judgrnent against the
plaintiff District and n1akes no reference to the joint
judgment against both plaintiffs. It is of course axiornatic that one may appeal frmn only a part of a judgment. What then is the situation? Defendants have
a final judgrnent against the State of utah for $2,830.00
(value of the land taken by it) and $23,109.00 amount
of the joint severance damages.
Assuming for the sake of r..rgurnent that it is reversible ·error, an assumption, however, not shared by
respondent, what would be the result f \\T ould the
judgment fixing severance darnages stand as against
the State of Utah~ It ~eerus to us that this result is
inevitable because the judgrnent against State was final
and unappealable so far as State is concerned before
an appeal was taken by the District.
Furthel'lnore, we contend, for the reasons heretofore set out, that plaintiffs haYe appealed only from that
part of the judg1uent fixing the YalUL' of the 66.8 acres
and that the notice of appeal did not refer in any rnanner
to the joint judgn1ent for scYPrance dan1ages. If we

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are correct in our contention, then it must follow either:
1. The judgment for severance damages is
final as against the State of Utah.
2. That by reason of the notice of appeal by
District only to the judgment \against
District and that the only issue presented by this appeal is whether or not
this appeal is limited in scope only to
that part of the judgment fixing the value
of the 66.8 acres.
The plaintiffs, by virtue of the stipulation, agreed
that the jury n1ight fix the amount of the severance
damages and leave it to the court to apportion the same
between the plaintiffs. Again assuming for the sake
of this argurnent only, that this court should reverse
the judgrnent for severance dmnages, then what would
be the effect~ Would it order a new trial in favor of
District only and submit to the jury the amount of
severance damages to be assessed against the District
only, which would be in direct violation of the stipulation
which was in the nature of a binding agreement that
the jury 1night determine the amount of severance damages as against both plaintiffs. By doing so, the court
would in effect set aside a valid and binding stipulation.
Respondent will now discu~s the various points
raised by appellant District in the order presented by
appellant:
POIN'l, 1. Appellant contends there is insufficient
evidence to support the answer to Question Nuntber
One. This respondent~ emphatically dispute. Defendants produce two experts - Wilkinson and Welker in
5
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addition to the testi1nony of defendant Olsen. They
testified that in their opinion this 66.8 acre tract was
worth $600.00 per acre. Their evidence as well as the evidence of the plaintiff, as shown on the map, disclosed that
the taking of this 66.8 acres of land took from this
dairy farm the very heart of the farm. It comprised
the choice meadow land most of which was sub-irrigated. The jury fixed its vaiue at $500.00 per acre.
Hence, the verdict is $100.00 per acre less than the
value fixed hy defendant's witnesses. Appellant asserts
that Wilkinson's opinion was based largely upon unaccepted offers of sale. This assertion we emphatically
dispute. An examination of Wilkinsons testimony reveals that he had appraised properties for more than
sixteen years in Weber County. He then detailed what
investigations he had 1nade and he arrived at on opinion
that the tract of land in question was worth $600.00
per acre. It see1ns difficult to understand appellant's
criticis1n, especially in view of the fact that his own
experts, as "·ell as the expert Capener (sic) arrived at
their conclusions in exactly the san1e way as did \Yilkinson. It is admitted by all sides that there had been very
few sales in the Yicinity of the land in question.
We think the conunents and observations 1nade by
Mr. Chief Justice nicDonough in the recent case of,
Weber Basin \Yater ConseiTancy District
vs. Skeen
328 P. ~nd 730
Reported in advance sheet of Septe1nber 1:2. 1958,
1s a cmnplete answer to appellant's contention. On
Page Sixteen of his brief counsel, in referring to ''rilkin6
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son's testimony, says :
"He, Wilkinson, testified further that * * * there
had been an increase in value because of the
enlargement of Pine View Reservoir."
He fails, however, to point out where Wilkinson so
testified. The only place where we can find a discussion of this matter in Wilkinson's cross examination
starts on the bottom of Page Ninety-three of the record.
Wilkinson was asked whether or not in his opinion
farm lands have increased in value substantially from
1950 to 1956. His answer was "Yes".
Then he was asked, "What percentage have they
increased~" and he answered:
"Well, I don't know."
Q. "You think they have increased and that
is all you know about it~"
A. "That is right."
Q. "Do you think that the value of lands in
Ogden Valley have increas·ed because of the enlargement of Pine View Reservoir~"
A. "I think they have."
Q. "And when did that increase occur~"
A. "Well, I think it has been going on ever
since they put the Pine View Dam in there from
the beginning."
Q. You think the Ogden Valley lands have
increased between 1950 and 1956 ~"
A. "Yes, Sir."
Q. "And you don't know how much f'
A. "No, I don't."
Nowhere does Wilkinson say that he thinks the lands

7
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have increased twenty-five per cent due to the enlargement of the Pine View Dam.
Wilkinson also testified that due to the inflation
real estate values have increased. We think this court
can take judicial notice of that fact. It is true that
witness W elkes was asked on cross examination if by
reason of the growing scarcity of meadow land in the
area due to the enlargement of Pine View Reservoir
that fact had affected the value of land in the area, and
he testified :
"I think tthat would have affected the value."
and when further pressed he answered:
"Perhaps about one-fourth."
We say, therefore, that the witness Wilkinson did not
say that the value of this land had increased twenty-five
per cent due to the enlargement of the reservoir and,
therefore, there is a1nple evidence to sustain the verdict
of the jury on the testimony of Wilkinson alone.
We shall reserve for further discussion the question
as to whether or not increased value of land generally
due to a condemnation proceeding is not recoverable
in fixing the value of the owner's land.

WHAT IS THE :MEASURE OF COI\IPENSATION
TO BE ALLOWED THE 0\VNER OF L~\ND
BEING CONDEl\INED1
Appellant asserb that defendant's evidence disclosed that the Yalne as te~tified to by defendant's witnesses, included enhanced value due to the raising of
Pine View Dam. A~ heretofore noted, however, neither

8
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the defendant Olsen nor his expert Wilkinson so testified. rrhey fixed the value of the tract taken at $600.00
per acre without reference to any increased value
brought about by the enlarge1nent of the dam. Hence,
there is e01npetent evidence in this record that the
value was fixed as of the date of the taking without
reference to any alleged enhanced value brought about
by the raising of the dam. With respect to defendant's
witness vVelker, the only reference to this subject is as
set forth on Page Eighteen of appellant's brief. On
cross exmnination counsel asked this question:
Q. ":Mr. Welker, in fixing this figure at
$600.00 per acre, did you take into consideration
the growing scarcity of meadow land up in that
area due to the enlargement of Pine View Reservoir1"

A. "I think that would have affected the
value."
It is apparent that counsel directed his question to the
scarcity of meadow land which is so necessary for dairy
purposes and not to increased value brought about by
the enlargmnent of the dam itself. If meadow land is
unavailable, it n1ight affect the value of the remain~_
ing land. Is there any valid reason why the owner of
such land should not be cornpensated for its actual
value due to the inability of prospective purchasers to/
obtain meadow land in the area in question~ In this
connection, it should be remembered that much of defendant's land being taken by the District will not be
covered by the waters of the enlarged reservoir but it
encompasses an area sought to be retained by the District abutting the reservoir, presumably for recreational

9
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purposes. The question of what elements may or may
not be included rests in utter confusion.
In revewing the authorities, it is apparent that
the courts have been influenced quite largely by the
wording of their constitutional and statutory provision.
Article One, Section 22
Utah Constitution.
provides that private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use.
Section 78-34-10

U. C. A.
provides how compensation and damages shall be
assessed, and
Section 78-34-11

U. C. A.
provides when the right shall be deemed to have accrued. Unlike sonie constitutional and statutory provisions, nothing is said about increased or diminishing
values by reason of the construction of the improvement. This court is conunitted to the proposition that
under our constitutional and statutory provisions the
value of the land 1nust be assessed as of the date of the
issuance of sumnwns and nothing is said as to how that
value must be ascertained.
All of the testinwny introduced by both plaintiff
and defendants ·was directed to the sole question as to
what was the value of this land on the day of the
taking, without reference to whether there was any increased value due to the enlargmnent of the Pine View
10
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Dam. The only difference between the evidence offered
by the plaintiff and defendants was a difference in
opinion as to its then market value.
There is a long annotation in 147 A. L. R. 65. A
reading of this annotation discloses the utter confusion
which exists. The original Pine View Dam was constructed in 1934. There is no evidence in this record
when it was officially determined that the reservoir
should be enlarged nor when it was determined that
defendant's land should be taken, nor when surveys
were made or filed, nor when the project was approved.
We contend that plaintiff utterly failed to prove the
essential pre-requisites to dernonstrate whether or not
the increase if not allowable was to take effect. If
counsel clai1ned that there was such an increase in values,
it seems to us in the light of the many decisions that it
was incumbent upon him to introduce evidence establishing these many facts and to offer ·evidence consistent with this theory, none of which he atte1npted to_
do. We call particular attention to Note Four on Page
85 and Kote Five on Page 88 of the annotations supra.
DID THE COURT ERR IN RE·FUSING TO AD11IT
DEFENDANT OLSEN'S INCOlVIE TAX RETURNS
FOR THE YEARS 1951 to 1956 ~
Appellant says at Page 21 of his brief that it was
the theory of the defendants that the highest and best
use of their farm was for a dairy; that because of its ·
location and the kind of land of which it was comprised,
it was peculiarly adapted for that use. We agree with
this statement and we might call attention to the fact
that that was also the view and theory of plaintiff's

11
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·expert Kiepe. He testified on cross examination that
before the taking he considered it a good dairy farm;
that to operate a dairy farm you have to treat it as a
unit; that the ideal dairy farm is one that produces
feed sufficient to feed the dairy herd and also produces
meadow lands for grazing and the production of hay
and grain and that this farm had all of those virtues.
('l"r. 221) In fact, we invite the court's attention
. to his entire testimony on cross examination from
Pages 221 to 249. At Page 229 he \\Tas asked this
question:
Q. "Now, of course, if the farm after the
taking is incapable of producing enough feed
for the dairy herd, does that fact interfere vrith
the efficient operation of the dairy~"

A. "Yes."
He states further at Page 239:
"I am prepared to say that I don't think it is a
full time operation any more and that any one
who would use it for a dairy fann would have
to greatly reduce his herd.''
Summarizing the evidence produced by both sides, it
sustained the following: The entire fann was contiguous; that it was capable of sustaining at least fifty
head of registered Guernsey and ten to fifteen head of
dry stock; that he had buildings, barns, 1nilk sheds
and other ilnproven1ents capable of operating a dairy
far1n of the size and quality referred to and that it was
an ideal dairy fann; that after the taking and the cutting up of the fann it could not support nwre than
fifteen to twenty dairy row~ at the nwst: that under

12
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modern conditions the dairy business requires the operation of a herd of at least fifty head. It was also
testified by defendants, and not denied by plaintiff, that
lands of comparable kind could not be purchased in
the vicinity of this farm.
Plaintiffs offered in evidence defendant's copy of
his income tax returns for the years 1951 to 1956 to
show what his losses and profits derived from his dairy
operations were as reflected therein. The court sustained defendant's objection to the introduction of these
tax returns. We contend that he court committed no
error in so doing.
What plaintiff claimed he was trying to prove by
the tax returns was whether or not there was a profit
made in the operation of defendant's business. The
tax returns for the years 1951 to 1954 related to combined operations of several separate business and farm
operations conducted by defendant. It is recognized,
of course, that profits for income tax purposes is
vastly different from profits as that term is usually
undersood. Deductions are allowable for depreciation
of improvements, fann buildings, etc. for bad debts,
for interest paid. Defendant offered to furnish plaintiff a statement as to the amount of milk produced and
sold, the amount of crops produced. (Tr. 46) but plaintiff did not want this information. He wanted to introduce the tax returns and nothing 1nore. We contend the
trial court was correct because:
A. Evidence of profits derived front a business
conducted on property is too speculative, uncertain and remote to be considered as a

13
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basis for computing or ascertaining the
market value of property in condemnation
proceedings.
See,
7 ALR, 163
B. The tax returns did not correctly reflect the
amount of profits actually earned from the
operation of this particular business.
C. To have received the tax returns would have
opened up a collateral proceeding which would
have led to utter confusion.
D. That if the court was in error, no prejudice
resulted from this ruling.
Defendant had no objection to plaintiff inquiring as to
how much hay, grain and pasturage was produced from
the farm, nor the amount of milk produced and sold.
This evidence would have given the jury complete information as to the productivity of the farm and of
the resulting income derived from the sale of the milk,
the only product which was sold. See,
Denver vs. Quick
113 P. 2nd, 999
134 A.L.R. 1120
It is our view that the operation involved '"as the conducting of a business on the land itself. All crops raised
were fed to the dairy herd. None was sold. The milk
produced was sold to the \Veber Central Dairy. To
operate a dairy requires a8 1nuch skill, knowledge and
efficiency as the conduet of a rnercantile or nianufacturing business. The trial judge observed, correctly we
think, that admitting these incon1e tax returns would
convert this action into a tax accounting suit; that it
would so confuse the issues that the jury would become
14
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confused and bewildered. Considerable !attitude on the
question of admission or rejection of evidence is reposed
in a trial judge and his rulings will not be overruled by
the appellate court except for a clear abuse of discretion.
Even though the court refused to permit the tax return~ to be introduced, he did allow a great amount of
!attitude by way of cross exan1ination. Note, for instance, the cross exa1nination of the witness Felt, commencing on Page 144 where the following questions
were asked:

Q. "Do you know whether it has n1ade a
profit in the last six years of operation~"
A. ''All I can judge on is the production of
his cattle. I know wl1at they produced in pounds
of butter fat average. ~l_1hey belong to the Cow
Testing Association and that is open to anybody."
Q. ··I understand."
A. "He had a very good herd. They produced better than 350 pounds."
Q. "I asked you if you knew whether he n1ade
a profit on his operation."
A. "I couldn't say as to that. He should
have done with the a1nount of butter fat produced
by his cows.'
(This latter answer was stricken)
Q. ''Do you know as a n1atter of fact whether
or not .Jfr. Olsen has made a profit on that ground
for the last five or six years in the operation of
the dairy herd ?"
A. "I don't know."
Q. "If I were to tell you I had information
to the effect that he suffered a loss over a nunlber of years, would you think I was telling you

15
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the truth or would I be misleading you f'
A. "Well, I wouldn't know.'
and again at Page 259 in the cross examination of defendant Olsen, the following questions were asked and the
following answers made:
Q. "Now, Mr. Olsen, did you realize a net
profit from the operation of your dairy farm in
1955f'
A. "I don't know."
Q. "I hand you your 1955 income tax return
and I'll ask you to examine that and then answer
the question."
The court sustained the defendant's objection to the
admission of the income tax returns, then followed:
Q. "Do you know 'vhether you operated the
dairy at a profit from 1951 to 1956, inclusive?"
A. ''No, sir."
Q. "You don't know t"
A. "No, sir."
Even if the court was in error in his ruling, which
we deny, yet we cannot see how the plaintiff was prejudiced. B~T inference, this jury was told that the defendant 1nade no profit. The question for the jury's
detennination was not whether he 1nade a profit in the
conduct of his business as reflected by his income tax
returns but the real question at issue was what was
the fair cash Inarket Yalue of the. property as of the
date of taking.
This court judicially know8, and the eYidence also
shows that Utah has experienced an unprecedented boom
due to the inflation, as well as the transition from an
agricultural to industrial status. Land Yalues haYP risen
16
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rapidly. Land values of today are not reflected in farm i
income but are based more on a speculative market.' :--·
If farm lands are valued on the basis of crop production,
the prices being paid today could never be justified.

DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
EVIDENCE AS TO PRIOR AMOUNT OLSENS
CONTRACTED TO PAY NEARLY SEVEN YEARS
PRIOR TO THE TAKING~
We think the court was justified in its ruling and
that no prejudice resulted from his ruling. As heretofore pointed out, the undisputed evidence discloses,
and this court judicially knows, that due to the impact
of inflation a dollar today is not worth more than
fifty cents or perhaps less, and, in addition to this,
Utah has experienced an unprecedented boom due to
its transition from an agricultural to industrial state:
Consequently, land values have risen rapidly and land 1~
values of today are not reflected in farm income but
rather on a speculative 1narket. Had we been passing /
through a stable economy there might be some basis
for permitting evidence of the purchase price nearly
seven years prior to be admitted, providing a proper
foundation is laid for the admission of this evidence,
although we doubt that even then, the trial court's refusal to admit such testimony would be an abuse of his
discretion. However that may be, when we consider
all of the facts, it is difficult for us to see how the
purchase price paid or agreed to be paid nearly seven
years prior can be of any aid to a jury in arriving at
present market values. Even under normal conditions,
evidence of this character might result in prejudice to
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the defendant. If a purchaser seven years ago had the
sagacity to purchase property at a bargain, even though
made on an open market, still there is no reason why
the condeamnor should profit because of his bargain
and the admission of this testin1ony could result in the
jury being influenced largely by the amount paid rather
than the market value as of the date of taking.
Counsel cites a recent work by,
Kaltenbach
See Page 24
It is to be noted that the author says that the introduction of this evidence is subject to hYo conditions;
namely, that the sale n1ust have been made ·within a
reasonable time so that it has some bearing on the
market value and also that the sale must lzwce been
voluntary. Appellant 1nade an offer of proof, see Tr.
261. He also asked defendant Olsen the direct question
as to what the contract price was. \\e submit that it
was incun1bent upon appellant, e\~en though this evidence was admissible, to first lay a proper foundation
to prove or offer to proYe that the sale fron1 Ferrins
was a voluntary transaction between parties, each of
whon1 was capable and desirous of protecting his own
interest. No such foundation for the ad1nission of this
testi1nony wa~ either laid or offered to be laid by
appellant.
It is also to be noted that in the citation fr01n,

Nichols (quoted hy appellant)
At Page 23,
the author says:
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''And no change in condition or market fluctuation in value has occurred since the sale.'
This seems to us to be a complete answer because all
of the evidence offered by both sides reflected that
there had been a fluctuation in values which had occurred since the date of the sale.
DID THE COURT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NUMBER SIX~
vVe contend that under the rulings of this court,
that Instruction Number Six is a correct statement
of the law with respect to when and under what circumstances severance dan1ages may be allowed where,
as in this case, the evidence by all experts was that
defendants' farm comprised one unit and that as a
unit it was adaptable for and used as a dairy unit
operation and that there were no comparable lands
available which could be purchased to replace the lands
actually taken. See,
Provo vVater Users Association
vs. Carlson
103 Utah, 93
133 P. 2nd, 777
State vs. L. D. S. Church
247 P. 2nd, 269, and
264 P. 2nd, 281.
The court did not commit reversible error for failure
to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction Number Five.
\Ve think the court fully instructed the jury on all
issues presented and that the jury fully understood the
19
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meaning of severance damages.
bers 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12.

See Instruction Num-

CONCLUSION

It is respondent's contention that no reversible error
was committed by the trial court; that the case was
fairly presented by both sides and that the instructions
view as a whole correctly and adequately instructed the
jury as to the law of the case; that the special verdict
of the jury is a1nply sustained by the evidence and that
the same should be affirmed.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
LE ROY B. YO-cXG of
YOUXG, THATCHER & GL~\S:JLcL.\'N,

AttoTneys for Respondent
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